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CASE NOTES
expressly included seems well founded by the
	 of 1 U.S.C. § 1 and the
theory of necessary implication.';
WILLIAM A. COTTER, JR.
Eminent' Domain—What Constitutes an Interference Sufficient to Con-
stitute a Taking.—Cities Service Oil Co. et al. v. City of New York.'
—An action was .brought: by the owner and the lessee of a gasoline station
to enjoin .the City of New. York and the New York Transit Authority, from
locating and maintaining bus stops in front of the entrances to the station
which 'was. located on the corner of two' streets; with. an
 entrance on 'each.
The Supreme Court; Kings County dismissed the..complaint,.the dismissal
being affirmed by•the Appellate Division, Seccind Judicial Department and
The Court'of Appeals. HELD:.That the .temporary and partial blocking of
the entrances .did not. constitute a taking of property, 'being merely . an
interferehce with a use orproperty of the type that must be borne by the
land owner, for. the larger. benefit- of the community and the general public.
The distinction•is to ,be draWn between eminent domain which involves
the taking of property for public use, and regulation or interference with
property falling short of a taking? The Cities Service case falls .into the
latter category.' Although the principle •
 by itself is relatively. simple,, the
application' of 'thiS principle to concrete. cases is much more •difficult since
it is a question of 'degree of interference.' ... • ,
In determining whether there has or has not been an , interference
amounting to a taking, each. case must be decided on; its own. facts. There
was no taking when the state rerouted traffic, although• the result adversely
affected• established business. 3 In Jones Beach Blvd. Estate v. Moses,'
Cited with approval in Cities Service, a more onerous burden was placed on
the plaintiff when left turns and U-turns were so limited that one entering
the parkway from plaintiff's property and desiring . ,to ,,travel. northward
was compelled to drive in the opposite direction' for five miles .before he,
could turn around. This case, like Cities Service, was , dismissed. When
however, in Holmes v. State,5 a street was closed not leaving a suitable
14 united States v. A & P Trucking Co., et al., supra note 8, at I24: , "The con=
elusion is not lightly to be reached that Congress intended that some carriers should not
be subject to the full gamut of sanctions—merely because of the form under which they
were organized to do business."; United States v. Adams Express Co., supra note 7, at
389-390, where the court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. 835 applied to joint stock companies
without the aid of 1 U.S.C. 1 holding, "But if it [the statute] imposes upon them the
duties under the words 'common carrier' as interpreted, ,it is reasonable to suppose
that the same words are intended to impose upon them the penalty . ."
1 5 N.Y.2d 110, 154 N.E.2d 814 (1958).
2 Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 53 N.E. 910 (1899) ; Pendsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon et al., 260 U.S..393 (1922) ; Wolff 'v. Mortgage Commissia,.270 N.Y. 428, 1
N.E.2d 835 (1936) ; Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.3 (3rd ed. 1950).
3 Clark County v. Mitchell, 223 Ark. 404, 266 S.W.2d 831 (1954) ; People 4. SaYig,
101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P.2d 702 (Ct. App. 1st D. 1951).
4 268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935).. 	 •
5 282 App. Div. 278, 123':N.Y.S.2d 179 (1953).
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means of access, there was a taking. Some courts hold that when the grade
of a road is changed with consequential damage to abutting property both
in the form of decreased valuation and of difficulties of access, it constitutes
a taking," while other courts have held to the contrary. 7 These cases are
not different in their application of the principle discussed above, but on
the application of the facts to this principle and, therefore, difficult to rec-
oncile.
In all cases there appears to be a balancing of the burden to the prop-
erty holder against the benefit to the public. The benefit to the public
outweighed the burden to the plaintiff in Cities Service: The result of this
case is based on the judgment of the court as to the degree of interference
and as to whether or not it was an interference sufficient to establish a
taking. This degree of interference necessary to constitute a taking is not
easily defined. The court considers the extent of the diminution of value
of the property. "When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all
cases, there must be an exercise of eminent domain . . ."" "The rule seems
to be deducible from the decisions of the courts . . . that if the owner of
property, because of the permanent physical improvement itself, suffers
damages . . . 'distinguished from mere inconvenience, he has a right to
action . . "On the whole, having regard to the smallness of the injury,
the nature of the evil to be avoided" 1" the determination of whether there
is a taking is reached. The judgment of the court as to the degree of inter-
ference necessary to constitute a taking depends on the diminution of prop-
erty value, permanency of the interference, the nature of the act itself
and whether the act is beneficial to the public. Thus the judgment of the
court in Cities Service was determined.
IRWIN N. ALBERTS
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act—Statutory Construction—Coal-Tar
Colors—Standard of Adulteration.—Flemming v. Florida Citrus Ex-
cbange.1—A petition was brought to review an order of the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, which disallowed the use of coal-tar in the
coloring of oranges. The United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit
set aside the order,2 holding that, even though the coal-tar coloring (Red
32) was per se toxic, it did not adulterate the oranges as proscribed by
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of l938, 3 since the quantity of poison
0 foal v. Chicago, 301 Ill. App. 536, 23 N.E.2d 237 (1939) ; Tulsa v. Hindman, 128
Okla. 169, 261 Pac. 910 (1927) ; Cucurullo v. City of New Orleans, 229 La. 463, 86
So.2d 103 (1956).
T State v. Snider, 131 W. Va. 650, 49 S.E.2d 853 (1948) ; Cantrell v. Pike County,
255 S.W.2d 988 (Ky. 1953).
8 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon et al., supra note 2, at 413.
0 Tulsa v. Hindman, 128 Okla. 169, 171, 261 Pac. 910, 911 (1927).
10 Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 374, 19 N.E. 390, 393 (1889).
1 358 U.S. 153 (1958).
2 Florida Citrus Exchange v. Folsom, 246 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1957).
Act June 25, 1938, c. 675, 1 1, 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. U 301-392.
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